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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRANDTJEN & KLUGE, INC., 
a corporation of the State of Minnesota. 
Plaintiff & Appellant 
vs. 
C. JEAN SHONKA & ANNA E. ERICKSON 
dba Acme Multigraph Co., 
Brigham City, Utah. 
Defendants & Respondents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
> No. 8112 
On the 18th day of October, 1951, after some prelimin-
ary meetings, a contract was entered into by and between 
Brandtjen & Kluge Inc., the plaintiff, and the Acme Multi-
graph Co., by Anna E. Erickson and C. Jean Shonka co-
partners, the defendants, (Ex. P-1) for the sale and pur-
chase of one 12 x 18 new Kluge Platen Press 6 roller for a 
total consideration on time of $2217.95. This contract pro-
vided that it should not become final until accepted by the 
plaintiff. It was accepted on the 25th day of October, 1951. 
It provided that a note for the installment payments as set 
out in the original contract shall be executed thereafter and 
that said note would he secured by a Conditional Sales Con-
tract. It provided that a competent man to install said 
equipment would be furnished by 1V end or and his expense 
while so engaged to be borne by the seller. The contract 
provided that the press includ(~d the equipment as listed on 
the back of the contract. On the back of the contract under 
the heading "Standard Equipment with new Kluge Automa-
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tic Platen Press" were listed various items of equipment and 
then there was an askerisk sign showing whether or not 
they were included and two of these notations are as fol-
lows: 
"*One set cast rollers, no charge-for erector's conveni-
ence. 
*Not included as standard equipment with open press." 
An open press is a press that is hand-fed and an auto-
matic press being one that is automatically fed with addi-
tional equipment and machinery that requires considerable 
adjusting, while the open press is shipped all assembled. 
The record bears out that they fully understood that they 
were buying an open press. 
The description of the machine "6 roller" referred to 
its construction since plaintiff manufactures both the six 
roller and the four roller press for the commercial market. 
These rollers were detachable parts composed of a roller 
core about which a casting material of the nature of rubber, 
or synthetic rubber, was expected to be applied to form the 
cast roller. 
Some time after the original contract was entered into 
and prior to any delivery being made, a letter of acknow-
ledgment of receipt of said contract was sent to the defen-
dants (Ex. D-5) with a notation that there was no represen-
tation made as to the date of delivery. 
While the original order provided that plaintiff would 
install the press, the salesman who had sold the same, a Mr. 
G. H. Raymond, had some correspondence with the defen-
dants (Ex. D-6) and following this correspondence on Nov-
ember 16, 1951, the defendants sent to the plaintiff (Ex. 
P-2) a letter waiving the installation of said machine at the 
expense of the seller. On the 27th day of November, 1951, 
a Conditional Sales Contract was made up pursuant to the 
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original agreement of the 18th day of October, 1951. In 
said Conditional Sales Contract the 12 x 18 Kluge Platen 
Press was listed "with 6 rollers" instead of "6 roller' as the 
original contract provided for (Ex. P-3). A note for the 
balance remaining due after the down payment (Ex. P-4) 
was sent at the same time and all were executed by the de-
fendants. Under the note and Conditional Sales Contract, 
monthly payments were to be made beginning with the 27th 
day of December, 1951, in the amount of $59.42. 
The machine was delivered to the defendants at Brig-
ham City, Utah, by railroad shipment, it having been 
bought F.O.B. St. Paul, and the defendants paid the ship-
ping charges in the amount of $157.28. It arrived. at its 
destination on or about the 6th day of December, 1951. It 
was crated and was moved by a drayage firm inside of the 
place of business of the defendants and remained crated for 
some time thereafter. The first installment payment be-
came due on the contract on December 27, 1951, in the 
amount of $59.42 and was paid, but installments No. 2, 3 
and 4 became delinquent and were not paid. Just before 
the installment No. 3 was due a letter dated the 22nd of 
February was sent by the defendants (Ex. -D-13) to Mr. 
Raymond and he was asked when he would install the said 
equipment. A carbon copy of said letter was sent to the 
plaintiff and a postcript asked for an extension of time for 
making the monthly payments. On March 19, 1952, (Ex. 
D-14) the defendants wrote to the plaintiff saying that the 
letter written to Mr. Rayment had been returned unclaim-
ed. They advised that the machine had not been installed 
and said that no additional payments would be made until 
it was, and furthf·r advising that if Mr. Raymond was not 
authorized to install, that a man would have to be sent from 
the company for said purpose and at this time demanded, 
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besides installing the machine, that a man also give them 
instructions in the operation of the machine (Ex. D-14). 
Under date of l\1arch 29, 1952, (Ex. P-15) Orner J. Call, at-
torney for defendants, advised plaintiff that defendants 
were negotiating with another firm ·for a machine 
to do the work of the one that they had pur-
chased from plaintiff and advised them that if 
arrangements were made for the immediate in· 
stallation by one of the company's erectors or agents and 
"the training promised" was furnished, that the defendants 
would waive the purported breach and bring payments on 
the contract up to date. 
As a consequence on the 5th day of April, 1952 (R. 125) 
Mr. Raymond the salesman called at the place of business 
of the defendants and spent two days assembling said ma-
chine (R. 126) and completely installed said machine 
with the exception of making the electrical connec-
tions (the original contract provided that the electrical con-
nections would be done at the expense of the defendants) 
and placed the roller cores upon the machine. According to 
their own witness, Claybaugh (R. 194) with the exception 
that the roller cores were not cast, which would cost $26.00 
and the electrical connections made, the machine was then 
ready to operate (R. 189). 
On May 9, 1952, the defendants signed an agreement 
for the purchase of a used machine (Ex. D-19) for $600.00. 
Just how long the negotiations had been going on for the 
purchase of the machine, cannot be determined from the 
record. Judge Jones says (R. 236): 
" .... I want to further state in the record, the reason 
the court only aJlows $1.00 is because ·within a few days 
or so from the time that the contract became rescind-
ed or in the state to be rescinded, your clients Mr. Call, 
began flirting with another company for the installa-
tion of another machine. It's just nip and tuck as to 
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whether your clients were negotiating with another 
company before the mechanic got there to install the 
first machine or not. So on that theory I hold the 
damages to $1.00 .... " 
On April 22, 1952, the defendants finally demanded a 
complete rescission of the contract, alleging as a breach, 
that there were no cast rollers with plaintiff's press and no 
installation. Defendants' witness testified that there was 
a roller company in Salt Lake City where defendants could 
have had the rollers cast for as little as $26.00 for all six 
and also testified that the machine could have been operated 
if they had the rollers cast and the electrical connections 
made. 
At the time of rescission, payments 2, 3 and 4 were con-
siderably delinquent. The defendants still had the machine 
in their possession ; refused to give it up and as a conse-
quence plaintiff initiated suit to reposses the property under 
the express terms of the Conditional Sales Contract. In 
answer, the defendants alleged the original sales contract 
as their defense and counterclaim for rescission. Such 
contract being incorporated into the allegations of third de-
fense No. 1 and first cause of action for counterclaim 
No. 1. No modification of this contract was ever plead as 
a basis for any claim and no amendment to the proceedings 
was ever made to encompass such a modification. 
Consequently the allegation before the court is: The 
machine was sold under a contract of October 18, 1951, 
which provided for no cast rollers and the machine was in-
stalled by the company's man without cast rollers as pro-
vided in said original contract. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS: 
POINT I: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT FOR THE FREIGHT PAID BY THE DE-
FENDANTS AS FOUND BY FINDING OF FACT NO. 
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5, AND GRANTING DAMAGE FOR SAID AMOUNT 
IN ADDITION TO A RESCISSION OF THE CON-
TRACT, AS SAID AMOUNT \VAS PAID TO A THIRD 
PARTY AND ANY JUDGMENT INCLUDING AN 
ITEM FOR FREIGHT PAID WOULD BE A JUDG-
MENT FOR DAMAGES IN ADDITION TO 
RESCISSION. 
POINT 2: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PLAINTIFF UN-
DER T'HE ORIGINAL CONTRACT AND HIS OBLI-
GATION TO DELIVER CERTAIN EQUIPMENT 
WITH THE SALE OF SAID PRESS CANNOT BE EN-
LARGED BY A SUBSEQUENT CONDITIONAL 
SALES CONTRACT EXECUTED PURSUANT TO 
SAID ORIGINAL CONTRACT AND WHICH CON-
-TAINED A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR SO AS TO 
MIS-DESCRIBE THE EQUIPMENT SET OUT IN THE 
ORIGINAL CONTRACT. THE ORIGINAL CON-
TRACT, PROMISSORY NOTE AND CONDITIONAL 
SALES CONTRACT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO-
GETHER. 
POINT 3: DEFENDANTS' WAIVED INSTALLATION 
OF T'HE PRESS. 
POINT 4: THAT THAT PART OF FINDING OF FACT 
NO.3 ALLEGING: 
"That by the terms of said agreement plaintiff became 
obligated to defendants to furnish one 12 x 18 Kluge 
Plate-n Press together with all standard equipment and 
with six rollers therefor, and to install said machine 
for defendants at their office in Brigham City, Utah." 
IS CONTRARY TO SAID AGREEMENT AND THE 
EVIDENCE BEORE THE COURT. 
POINT NO. 5: THAT FINDING OF FACT NO. 4 AND 
PARTICULARLY THAT PART: 
"That there was not delivered \vith said machine six 
rollers called for by the contract." 
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IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND SAID CON-
TRACT AND THAT PART OF SAID FINDING OF 
FACT TO-WIT: "AND SAID MACHINE WAS NOT 
INSTALLED" IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT 6: A BREACH, IF ANY WAS COMMITTED BY 
PLAINTIFF, WAS SLIGHT. EQUITY SHOULD 
THEREFORE DENY RESCISSION. 
POINT 7: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FIND-
ING IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
PIONT No. 1: That the court erred in granting judg-
ment for the freight paid by the defendants, as found by 
finding of fact No. 5, and granting damage for said amount 
in addition to a rescission of the contract, as said amount 
was paid to a third party and any judgment including an 
item for freight paid would be a judgment for damages in 
addition to rescission. 
We find in California Juris prudence Vol. 6 page 388 
Art. 233, the following: 
"Results of election to rescind: Upon the breach of a 
contract a party thereto may treat it as rescinded, and 
if he has advanced money on it, bring an action for its 
hecovery; or he may treat the contract as still in force 
and maintain an action for damages for the breach, 
but he cannot pursue both courses. (Lemle vs. Barry 
181 Cal. 1, 183 Pac. 150: House vs. Piercy, 181 Cal. 247, 
183 Pac. 807). If the facts exist which justify a rescis-
sion by one party, and he exercises his right and de-
clares a rescission in some effectual manner, he ter-
minates the contract, and it cannot thereafter be made 
the basis of an action for damages caused by breach 
of the covenants." 
Again in American Jurisprudence Vol. 12, page 1038, Ar-
ticle 455, under the title. "Effect of Rescission,'' we have: 
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"Generally speaking, the effect of rescission is to extin-
guish the contract. The contract is annihilated so ef-
fectually that in contemplation of law it has never had 
any existence, even for the purpose of being broken. 
Accordingly, it has been said that a lawful rescission of 
an agreement puts an end to it for all purposes, not 
only to preclude the recovery of the contract price, but 
alao to prevent the recovery of damages for breach of 
contract. (There are then cited numerous cases in 
support of this contention under footnote 14.) The 
effect of rescission of an agreement is to put the parties 
back in the same position they were in prior to the 
making of the contract. An election to rescind a con· 
tract waives the right to sue upon it. After a rescis-
sion for a breach, an action cannot be maintained on 
the contract for such braech. After rescission for a 
breach, there is no right to damages for such breach." 
This question· is elementary and is followed by so many 
different texts, that the writer will not pursue it further 
except to go back and show what the court did in respect 
to this. In the record (R-156) we have the following: 
"Q. I have a question that isn't proper redirect. Do 
you know whether or not anything was paid to the 
Union Pacific Railroad for freight? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. For bringing this machine ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. l\1ANN: I object to it as incompetent, ir-
revelant, and immaterial, as the contract itself shows 
that it was sold f.o.b. back there. Even if they res-
cinded it, it was still sold f.o.b. back there and wouldn't 
have any bearing whether the freight was paid by them 
or not, because all the negotiations were f.o.b. 
lVI:R. CALL: I agree as to the rescission, but that 
is an element of damages under the first cause of this 
action for counterclaim. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You 
may answer. _ 
Q. Do you know whal the amount was? 
A. As I remember, it was around a hundred fifty 
three dollars or fifty seven dollars, some such 
amount. 
THE COURT: HaYe you added it up? How much 
is it? 
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MR. CALL: $157.28. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Now even though counsel for the defendants admitted 
that it would not apply if a rescission were granted, and 
that he was offering it as a damage item, the court in 
granting the defendants a Decision, said (R-234:) 
THE COURT: While I'm thinking about it, in the 
case of Brandtjen aqd Kluge vs. C. Jean Shonka and 
Anna Erickson, finding and ~onclusions and judgl!!ent 
may be entered in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff for the down payment of $400, and some 
dollars, and the freight charges of a hundred fifty dol-
lars, plus $1.00 damages. The court finds that this 
Kluge roller press with six rollers means six rollers, 
and the court finds that there was a duty on the part of 
Brandtjen-Kluge to install the printing press. I want 
to further state in the record, the reason the court 
only allows $1.00 is because within a few days or so 
from the time that the contract became rescinded or in 
the state to be rescinded, your clients, Mr. Call, began 
flirting with another company for the installation of 
another machine. It's just nip and tuck as to whether 
your clients were negotiating with another company 
before the ~echanic got there to install the first ma-
chine or not. So on the theory I hold the damages to 
$1.00. However, Mr. Call, you prepare the findings 
and judgment. $1.00 damages, the down payment 
back, plus the freight charges, and both sides can ap-
peal. 
MR. C~LL: On the damages, I take it if we are 
entitled to rescind we won't be entitled to damages. 
THE COURT: You want to waive that? 
MR. CALL: We have no objection to it. 
THE COURT: All right" 
We have this situation. That counsel for the defendants 
fully understood the law and knew that he could defend by 
asking damages, which means that the contract is still in 
full force and effect, so he sets up his first counterclaim 
to that effect and asks for lamages which include the 
freight that he has paid. On his second counterclaim he 
asks for a rescission which means to terminate the con-
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tract and asks that the money that his clients have paid to 
the company be returned. He understands it in court and 
when testimony is offered regarding freight he again tells 
the court it is on the damage side of his counterclaim and 
that it wouldn't apply to a rescission, but the court is 
bound to give it to him so refuses to call it damages in its 
oral decision and refers to it as freight charges. The court 
then goes on and tries to give an extra dollar damage but 
ocunsel for the defendants asked that it be waived on the 
ground that he could not rescind and also receive damage. 
Consequently any judgement ordered by the court which 
would include an item of freight paid to third parties, is in 
fact, an attempt by the court to grant damages on the 
strength of the contract and then in the same breath res-
cind the contract and direct a judgment for the return of 
the down payment. The court erred. in this respect. 
POINT No. 2: That the responsibility of plaintiff under 
the original contract and his obligation to deliver certain 
equipment with the sale of said press cannot be enlarged 
by a subsequent conditional sales contract executed pur-
suant to said original contract and which contained a typo-
graphical error so as to mis-describe the equipment set out 
in the original contract. The original contract, promissory 
note and conditional sales contract should be construed to-
gether. 
Three written documents originated the rights of the 
parties in the instant case. These were the original sale 
contract, the promissory note, and the conditional sale con-
tract. Being part of the same transaction and executed in 
connection with the san1e subject matter, they should be 
construed together to further the purpose of their terms. 
\Vm. Lindeke Land Co. vs. Kalman, 1934- Minn _, 252, 
N.W. 650, 652, 653: 
10 
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" (c) Separate writings as part of the same transac-
tion must be construed together. 13 Corpus Juris, Art. 
487, p. 528 says: 'Where several instruments are 
made as part of one transaction, they. will be read to-
gether, and each will be construed with reference to the 
other. This is true, although the instruments do not 
in terms refer to each other. So if two or more agree-
ments are executed at different times as parts of the 
same transaction they will be taken and construed to-
gether." (dark print added) 
Similarly, see: Nau vs. Vulcan Rail & Construction 
Co., 1941 286 N.Y. 188, 36 N.E. 2d 106, in which the court 
was required to ascertain whether an "interference suit" 
in the United States Patent Office was included within the 
context of the term "infringement suit," as used in the con-
tract between the parties. Three agreements were entered 
during the course of the relationship of the parties. They 
were all connected with the furtherance of the sale "turn-
stiles" being produced by defendant, so the court examined 
them all rather than just one (N.Y. 197, N.E. 2d 110): 
"The contract between the defendant and the city of 
New York was referred to in defendant's acceptance of 
plaintiff's offer and substantially made a part thereof, 
and the last writing referred to and substantially made 
the acceptance a part of it. All three instruments were 
executed at substantially the same time, related to the 
same subject-matter, were cotnemporaneous writings 
and must be read together as one (authority cited). 
Even though they had been made at different dates 
that fact would not affect the rule since they were to 
effectuate the same purpose and formed a part of the 
same transaction.!' (Dark print added) 
In accord: Paine-Gallucci Inc. vs. Anderson, 1952,-
Wash-, 246 Pac 2d 1095, 1097; and 77 C.J.S., Sales, Sec-
tion 71, p. 734. 
In taking cognizance of the rule also, Williston has em-
phasized that the direct reference to the related writings, 
as appears in some cases, is not essential. It is sufficient 
that they are connected with the same transaction. III 
11 
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Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed), Section 628, p. 1801. In-
terpretation of Several Connected Writings: 
c.Where a writing refers to another document, that 
other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to 
be in~~rpreted as part of the writing .... Even where 
a wr1bng does not refer to another writing, if such 
other writing was made as part of the same transac-
tion, the two should be interpreted together." 
The rule is purely one pertaining to the construction of 
writings and is not affected by the merger of the particular 
instrum-ents into a later one. See Fleisher Engineering & 
Construction Co. vs. Winston Bros. Co., 1950, - Minn. -, 
42 N.W. 2d 396. As demonstrated in the various decisions 
it has a dual purpose. Besides aiding the interpretation of 
the terms and furthering their intent, it lends effect to as 
much of the contract of the parties as is possible. Retta 
Sterling vs. The Head Camp, 1905, 28 Utah 526, 80 Pac. 
1110. There, the court considered three separate writings 
in determining the contract of the plaintiff and defendant: 
a death benefit certificate; the by-laws of defendant or-
ganization; and the Constitution of defendant organization. 
In its terms, the benefit certificate refered to the other in-
stuments, so the court held (Utah 538) : 
"The rule is elementary that where, as .i!l ijlis case, a 
contract consists of several different instruments, eaeh 
document will be read and construed with reference to 
the other, and, that the contract as a whole will, if pos-
sible, be given effect." 
The demurrer to the complaint was sustained, decedent 
not having been bound in agreement with defendent. 
The principal pervading this method of construction 
which deals with separate writings is the same as that per-
tinent to a single contract. A construction that reconciles 
the terms of the agreements or agreement is preferable to 
one that neutralizes them. Vitagraph Inc. vs. American 
Theatre Co., 1930, 77 Utah 71, 291 Pac. 303. In that case 
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the court construed the meaning of an assignment of a 
contract (lease of film) to determine whether the contract 
was modified by it. Defendant insisted that it became a 
guarantor rather than a principal. In concluding that such 
a modification had not occurred, the court followed 6 R.C.L., 
Section 227, pp. 837, 838, at (Utah 79, Pac. 306) : 
"Seeming contradictions must· be harmonized 'if that 
course is reasonably possible. Each of its provisions 
must be considered in connection with the others, and if 
l)OSsible effect must be give:q to all. A construction 
which entirely neutralizes one provision should not be 
adopted if the contract is susceptible to another which 
gives effect to all of its provisions." (Dark print 
added.) 
One of the main bases for a rescission on which defen-
dants have relied is that there was a breach of contract, be-
cause plaintiff failed to include "cast" rollers with the pur-
chase. Defendants have insisted such "cast" rollers were 
required by the general description of the press in the con-
ditional sales contract as "1 12 x 18 Kluge Platen Press 
with 6 rollers and all standard equipment." Althogh their 
construction of that agreement is repugnant to the terms of 
the original contract of October 18, 1951. Defendants are 
unable to explain their position by any more specific pro-
viso in the conditional sales contract. 
On the other hand, if the conditional sale contract is 
read in conjunction with the original contract rather than 
segregated, a contrary conclusion is readily apparent. 
Under both agreements only "standard equipment" was to 
accompany the purchase. The conditional sale contract 
does not purport to list that equipment. However, the 
original order did list it in detail, and in so doing, specifi-
callp excluded "cast" rollers from being such standard 
equipment with the Open Press. Therefore, in ascertaining 
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the meaning of the term and what it comprehended in the 
conditional sale contract, it would seem only reasonable to 
rely on the agreement of the parties to which the reference 
was made. Usually, the special provision of a contract 
control the general, 12 Amer. Juris., Contracts, Section 244, 
p. 779, and the specific designation of the subject matter of 
a sale cannot be enlarged by construction. 77 C.J.S., Sales, 
Section 74a., p 737, so the conclusion would be that under 
both agreements, defendants would purchase the same 
thing: a six roller platen press without cast rollers. 
Assuming that there was doubt as to the meaning of 
the description of the machine in the conditional sale con-
tract as a "Kluge Platen Press with six rollers and all 
standard equipment,'' defendants have stated that the con-
tract should be construed to the disadvantage of the party 
who drafted it, relying on American Jurisprudence for the 
rule. The Utah Court however, has deemed that method of 
construction ordinarily objectionable. Caine vs. Hagen-
berth 1910, 37 Utah 69, 106, Pac. 945, at (Utah 94, Pac. 
953): 
"This rule is not favored by the courts, and will only be 
invoked in extreme cases and as a last resort. Besides 
it is, as a general thing, invoked only in deeds poll, in 
insurance contracts, in contracts to avoid forfeitures, 
and in contracts that are not favored by law ... Con-
tracts, therefore, in which the parties thereto make 
mutual promises do not ordinarily come within this 
rule." (Dark print added) 
Instead of such an extreme measure, the proper rule 
would be in the nature of those repeatedly mentioned in the 
cases. First, the writings composing the entire transac-
tion of the sale: the original contract, the promissory note, 
and the conditional sale contract, should be reviewed to de-
cide what the terms me~m. Then, as much of the prior con-
tract should be enforced as is possible within the purview 
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of that agreement. Finally, wherever possible the agree-
ments should be reconciled. The result in the present case 
would be for a "Kluge Platen Press 6 Roller" as described 
in the original agreement to be a press of six roller type 
without the casting as they were specifically excluded from 
the standard equipment. 
POINT No.3: Defendants Waived Installation of the Press. 
The original contract of October 18, 1951, (Ex. P-1) 
contained this clause: 
"A competent man to install said equipment, to be fur-
nished by vendor, his expenses, w bile so engaged, to 
be borne by the seller." 
On November 16, 1951, after the original contract had been 
accepted by the Home Office on October 25, 1951, the de-
fendants, after some correspondence with the agent that 
had sold the machine, sent to the plaintiff a letter (Ex. P-2) 
which reads as follows: 
"This letter is to release you from that portion of the 
contract we signed that states: 'a competent man to 
install said equipment to be furnished by Vendor; his 
expenses, while so engaged, to be borne by the seller!" 
"Mr. Raymond has consented to assist us in our initial 
training inasmuch as we have had no letter press ex-
perience whatever. We know absolutely nothing about 
the press in general or its ~unction." 
Even though they gave that release, they made another de-
mand upon the plaintiff (Ex. D. 14) on March 19, 1952, that 
the plaintiff send a man to install the machine, and even 
though they had once waived this requirement they set up 
in their pleadings that they had the right to rescind be-
cause the machine was not installed. Yet the record shows 
(R. 149) that within two weeks after the letter of March 
19, or thereabouts to-wit April 5, Mr. Raymond came to 
the property of the def<•n(lants and im~talled the machine 
with the exception of the electrical connection and cast 
rollers, which were not a part of the original contract. 
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Defendants have insisted that a waiver must be sup-
ported by consideration. Notwithstanding that they may 
or may not be correct in regard to a modification or change, 
the same rule does not prevail when a party waives, releases, 
excuses, or dispenses with the performance of a condition 
in a substituting agreement. No consideration is then re-
quired. Stubbs vs. Philadelphia Life Insurance Co., 1929, 
-So. Car.-, 149 S.E. 2 (question of the waiver of non-
payment of an insurance premium by retention of the pre-
mium note) at (S.E. 11) : 
"Waiver, as has been often defined, is the voluntary re-
linquishment of a known right - that is, that it needs 
no consideration moving between the parties; it is uni-
lateral and depends entirely upon conduct of the com-
pany; what it did and what it said-was not only material 
but vital, for in no other way could its purpose and in· 
tentions be disclosed." (Dark print added) 
In accord: Clark vs. Dye, 1924,- Minn -, 197 N. W. 209, 
212: 
"A waiver, therefore being merely a voluntary relin-
cannot be regarded as a contract, and does not require 
a consideration to support it." 
In accord: Schwart et al vs. Wilmer, - Md. -, 44 A. 1059, 
1061: 
"A waicer, therefore, being merely a voluntary relin-
quishment of a right, cannot be regarded as a contract, 
and does not require a new consideration to support it." 
In accord: Champion Spark Plug Co., vs. Automobile Sun-
dries, 1921, C.C.A., 2d, 273 Fed. 7 4, 79; Bank of American 
National Trust & Savings Ass'n vs. l\laryland Casualty Co., 
1941, D. C., N. D., Ca., 3D, 37 Fed Supp 677, 683, 684; Ma-
haska County State Bank vs. Coist et al, 1893, - Ia. -, 
54 N.W. 450, 453; and Smith vs. Coutant, 1942,- I a-, 6 
N.W. 2d, 421, 426. 
The basis for sustaining the validity of a waiver seems 
to be a practical one. 2. Herman on Estroppel, Section 1020, 
P. 1149: 
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"No une who waives or dispenses with the performance 
of a contract can rely upon the failure to perform it, 
either as a defense or a cause of action, for no one can 
complain of a default which he has caused or sanction· 
ed." (Dark print added) 
Like the other authority, the Utah court has also held 
a waiver of a condition in a contract binding. Crescent 
Mining Company vs. Wasatch Mining Company, 1888, 5 
Utah 624, 634, 19 Pac. 198, 203: 
''A party to a con tract may always dispense with the 
performance of a condition in his favor, and when this 
is done it is the same as though the thing dispensed 
with had been done.' (Underlining added) 
Similarly, see: Ryan vs. Curlew Irrigation & Reservoir 
Company, 1909, 36 Utah 382, 104 Pac. 218, where the court 
again deemed the waiver of a clause in a contract irrevo-
cable (Utah 389, 104 Pac. 220): 
"It seems to us that under the undisputed evidence no 
other legal inference is permissible than that both par-
ties waived the so-called referee clause as if by mutual 
consent. If, therefore, the clause was ignored at a 
time when it might have been of some use to the parties, 
it would be an injustice, if not a fraud to now enforce 
it as against one and in favor of the other. Courts 
should not enforce what the parties themselves have by 
mutual consent waived.'~ (Dark print added) 
POINT NO. 4: That that part of finding of fact No. 3 
alleging: 
"That by the terms of said agreement plaintiff became 
obligated to defendants to furnish one 12 x 18 Kluge 
Platen Press together with all standard equipment and 
with six rollers therefor, and to install said machine for 
defendants at their office in Brigham City, Utah." 
is contrary to said agreement and the evidence before the 
court. 
POINT NO. 5: That finding of fact No. 4 and particularly 
that part: 
"That there was not delivered with said machine six 
rollers called for by the contract." 
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is contray to the evidence and said contact and that part of 
said finding of fact to-wit: "And said machine was not 
installed'' is contrary to the evidence. 
Inasmuch as point No. 4 and point No. 5 are related in 
subject matter and can be treated together, they are treated 
hereafter as follows: 
Both plaintiff and defendant plead that the original 
contract was entered into on the 18th day of October, 1951, 
and accepted by the plaintiff on the 25th day of October, 
1951. The contract is set out in the pleadings and is Ex P.l. 
This contract is complete and became binding when 
accepted by plaintiff and carried a clause within which 
reads: 
"This contract shall not be binding on Brandtjen & 
Kluge Inc., until its written acceptance is endorsed by 
the home office." 
The contract also provided: 
"That no agreements or representations expressed or 
implied not specified in the warranties on the reverse 
side hereof respecting this contract or the goods hereby 
ordered have been made by said vendor unless contain-
ed herein, and this contract constitutes the entire 
agreement of the ·parties." 
The contract also provided that a note for the balance of the 
purchase price to be secured by a conditional sales contract 
would be entered into payable in 30 monthly installments 
the first installment to be due 30 days after shipment. In 
other words the note and the conditional sales contract 
could not be determined until the actual shipping had taken 
place and the beginning date fixed. The exact date was 
the only item that had not been determined by the contract 
and it had been agreed there, that the shipping date would 
fix that. 
The contract further provided that: 
"A competent man to install said equipment to be fur· 
nished by vendor, his expenses, while so engaged, to be 
borne by the seller." 
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The contract described the press that was being sold as: 
"One 12 x 18 New Kluge Platen Press, 6 roller, includ-
ing equipment as listed on back hereof including the 
guarantee and warranty there set forth." 
On the back of the contract is a heading listing the 
standard equipment with the automatic press with an aster-
isk noting that with the open press the items so marked 
were not included, such as: 
* 1 set cast rollers. No charge - - for erector's con-
venience. 
*NOT included as standard equipment with Open Press. 
That they fully understood that they were buying an 
open press which would not include the rollers is brought 
out in the cross examination of defendant, Jean Shonka. 
(R.116) 
Q. I show you plaintiff's exhibit one. Where is it that 
it says on there that there will be delivered six rollers 
with that machine? 
A. Just the impression on it, twelve by eighteen Kluge 
platen press, six roller. 
Q. It doesn't say "with six rollers", does it? 
A. Not on this contract, no. 
Q. And that was your original contract; isn't that 
correct? 
A. This is, yes. 
Q. And that's the one you were cross examined on 
by Mr. Call? 
A. Yes', sir. 
Q. And there is no place in it where it says "with six 
rollers?" 
MR. CALL: Well, I'll stipulate - if you'll rely on 
that contract, I'll stipulate we didn't. 
MR. MANN: The contract speaks for itself. I don't 
need to stipulate. 
MR. CALL: Okeh. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Calling your attention to where it speaks of a 
twelve by eighteen new Kluge platen press, six roller, 
there is a notation underneath, "including equipment 
as listed on back hereof_ including the warranty as set 
forth." 
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MR.CALL: I object to this as improper cross ex-
amination. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. On the back of this contract there is another no-
tation, "Standard equipment,'' is there not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And at the bottom of that list there is a little 
asterisk? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it says, "Not included as standard equipment 
with Open Press." That is that mark? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then we say, "One set cast rollers. No charge 
- for Erector's convenience." 
MR. GALL: Let me make my objection to this on 
the ground he's reading the part that talks about a 
new Kluge automatic platen press, and the front talks 
about a new Kluge platen press. 
MR. MANN: But the notation was about an open 
press. I'm not talking about an open press. 
(Argument off the record) 
MR. CALL: I object to that. May I point out to 
the court we have from the first witness, "That the 
vendor hereby agrees to sell to the vendee," not a 
Kluge automatic platen press, but one twelve by 
eighteen Kluge platen press. 
MR. MANN· Yes, open. 
MR. CALL: ·on the back it refers to an automatic 
platen press, something different from what was agreed 
to be bought. 
THE COURT: I'll let him cross examine. 
MR. CALL: I object to it on that ground. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. The reference I had with the asterisk it the no-
tation, "Not included as standard equipment with open 
press." Is that corect? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what you bought was an open press? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the notation with the asterisk is one set of 
cast rollers, no charge, for erector's convenience? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did it indicate to you? I'll put it that way. 
A. What that indicates and what we were led to be-
lieve ---
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Q. No, what does it indicate to you? 
MR. CALL: Ask her if it indicated anything to 
her. I object to it on the ground it calls for a con· 
elusion. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. Can I answer by saying that part of the-- I mean, 
all we paid any attention to was the front side of the 
contract in signing it. 
Q. You didn't read the whole contract? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know you are charged with everything 
there? 
A. Yes. 
The plaintiff makes two different types of open presses 
as stated by Anton Petersen, a professional erector of the 
plaintiff (R.206). 
Q. Do open presses come in made up with a variation 
in the number of rollers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what variation of rollers in the presses that 
Kluge makes do you have? 
A. Trey make a four roller and a six roller." 
So that in the very first instant when the contract was 
executed by the defendants, they purchased on the 18th of 
October, 1951, an open press 12 x 18 of the six roller type, 
and that said purchase did not include cast rollers. Even 
though they signed the agrement on the 18th day of Octo-
ber, 1951, the agreement provided, and they so understood, 
that it had to be accepted by the home office and they re-
ceived notice of acceptance as shown by their Exhibit D-5 
under date of October 25, and in that notice it again recites: 
"A copy of the contract, containing the entire agreement 
of the parties, is enclosed." 
Some time after the execution of the original contract 
the salesman and the defendants got together. Just why, 
cannot be determined fr()ffi the record unless the statement 
of Jean Shonka on cross examination (R.128) might show: 
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GALLEY 8 
"A. When we signed the contract and paid him fifty 
dollars at our home on ~eptember 1~, he informed us 
that the machine. an erector would set up this machine, 
it would be in complete running order and he would 
come and show us how to print and run two or three jobs for us. 
Q. After he told you that you signed the contract that 
said it contained all of the statements between you and 
him. or as far as the agreement was concerned? 
A. We signed the contract. 
Q. Which reduced to writing all your understandings? 
A. Technically, yes. 
Q. Now, is there anything in this contract that says 
he has to furnish you with the six rollers? 
A. No, but it says there will be an erector to erect the 
machine. 
Q. Now, I go back to this exhibit number two. That 
has your signature on· it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, this says, "Mr. Raymond has consented to 
assist us in our initial training inasmuch as we have 
had no letter press experience whatever." There was 
nothing in the contract that required Mr. Raymond to 
assist you in your training, was there? 
A. No. 
Q. Then you signed this letter of November 16 to 
Brandtjen and Kluge saying that because Mr. Raymond 
would assist you, that you would waive the responsi-
bility of them installing your machine? 
A. We didn't waive - -
MR. CALL: Just a minute. I object to that be-
cause you don't state what that release says. 
(Argument off the record) 
lVIR. MANN: Let the record show she's got it in 
her hands looking at it. 
A. Will you read the question, please? 
(The last question was read by the reporter). 
A. We released them from that portion of the contract 
that stated a competent man to install the said equip-
ment to be furnished by vendor, his expenses, while 
engaged, to be borne by the seller." 
As a consequence of some understanding between the 
defendants and the agent who sold the machine the court 
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allowed the defendants to introduce Exhibit D-6 to explain 
plaintiff's Exhibit P-2, yet no pleading was ever made that 
the original contract was modified by any subsequent 
agreement insofar as the defendants were concerned, the 
plaintiff pleading however, that they were released by the 
defendants from performing that part that required them 
to send an erector to install the machine. 
Now when the machine is shipped and the conditional 
sales contract and note is made up and sent to be signed, 
it became necessary to again describe the press. At this 
time the stenographer is filling in the description said: 
"1 12 x 18 Kluge Platen Printing Press with 6 rollers 
and all standard equipment" (Ex. P-3) 
The original contract description (Ex. P-1) was: 
"1 12 x 18 New Kluge Platen Press 6 roller including 
the equipment as listed on back hereof, including the 
Warranty there set forth." 
and on the back it specifically provides that no cast rollers 
are included. 
They admit in their testimony that no cast rollers were 
included in the original contract. They admit they waived 
the installation and now use these two items to ask for 
the privilege of rescinding the contract. 
POINT NO. 6 A Breach, if any was committed by plain-
tiff. was slight. Equity should. therefore deny rescission. 
Rescission. a creation of equity, has always been deemed 
an extreme remedy. It will not be granted for every 
breach of contract. Kampman et al vs. Mcinerney, 1951 
-Wis- 432, 46 N.W.2d 205. In that case, plaintiffs 
sold tavern fixtures under the Uniform Sales Act. There 
was a delay in performance and defendants attempted to 
rescind. The court found time was not the essence so 
there was no basis for rescission (N. W. 2d 207; 
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"A contract may not be rescinded for every breach 
thereof. A breach of contract not so substantial as 
to defeat the object of the parties in making the con-
tract does not entitle the other party to rescind." (Dark 
print added). 
In accord: Vincent vs. Palmer, 1941, -MD-, 19 A 2d 
183, 188: 
"A court, however, will not grant a rescission for casual 
or unimportant breaches, but only for a substantial 
breach tending to defeat the object of the contract." 
Where the defect can be remedied by an award for money 
damages, rescission will not be granted: Johnson vs. Meiers, 
1946,-Mont-,164 Pac 2d 1012. There, plaintiff and 
defendants had agreed to share the use of a building, 
including the use of the furnace, hallways, stairway,etc., 
In the suit, defendants had counterclaimed for rescission, 
alleging that plaintiff . had destroyed the heating plant. 
Defendants had to pay $700 to have it replaced. The 
court ruled that the breach was not substantial, citing 12 
Amer. Juris., Contracts, Section 440 at (Pac 2d 1014): 
"A breach which goes to only a part of the consider-
ation, is incidental and subordinate to the main pur-
pose of the contract, and may be compensated for in 
damages does not warrant a rescission of the contract." 
Applying the law to the facts, the court continued (Pac 
2d 1014): 
"The main purpose of the contract was to construct 
one building on the three parcels of land wherein the 
parties would have the use of the hallways and stair-
way. The matter of heating the building was inci-
dental and subordinate to the main purpose which 
was to have but one building." 
In accord: LruBar vs. Lindstrom, 1924, -Minn-, 197 N. 
W. 756, in which plaintiff contracted to buy a house which 
defendants represented as being "first class." The price 
was $17,000. Plaintiff attempted to rescind the contract 
because the roof sagged and leaked. The court found 
that by an expenditure of $275 the house could be placed 
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in the condition it was represented to be by defndants. 
On appeal, the court decided that rescission was not proper, 
and plaintiff was awarded his damages (N.W. 756): 
"Plaintiff can be fully compensated in damages for 
correcting the fault in the roof and when this is done 
he will have all that he bargained for and in the con-
dition in which it was represented to be." (Dark print 
added). 
Also, see: United States vs. Haynes School Dist. No. 8, 
(U.S.D.C., E.D., Ark., 1951) 102 Fed. Supp 843, 849; I 
Black on rescission, Section 198 pp. 553, 554; 17 C.J.S., 
Contracts Section 422, p. 906. 
In recognizing that parties should attempt to reconcile 
their difficulties rather than abandon their agreements, 
6 R.C.L., Section 311 has also supported the rule at page 
926: 
"It is not every partial failure to comply with the terms 
of a contract by one party which will entitle the other 
party to abandon that contract at once. In order to 
justify an abandonment of it and of the proper remedy 
growing out of it, the failure of the opposite party 
must be a total one, -- - the object of the contract must 
be defeated or rendered unattainable by his misconduct 
or default." 
Utah has recognized and followed the rule in Sidney Ste· 
vens Implement Co. vs. Hintze, 1937, 92 Utah 264, 277, 
278, 67 Pac 2d 632, 638, 111 ALR 331, 339, 340. 
Defendants have sought rescission because there were 
allegedly no cast rollers with the press and no completion 
of the installation. Although plaintiff has argued that 
full performance occured, assuming there were such a fail-
ure plaintiff still maintains that there was no substantial 
breach of contract which would warrant a rescission. First, 
defendants could have had their rollers cast at a very slight 
expem;e by sending them tn the roller company in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, the cost being about $26.00. That 
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expenditure equalled less than 2 9~ of the value of the ma-
chine, and it seems difficult to understand why defendants 
did not incur it rather than to seek to abandon their contract 
immediately. The situation is similar to that displayed 
in LaBar vs. Lindstrom 1924, -Minn-, 197 N.W. 756 
supra p. 13, for once the expenditure was incurred, defen-
dants would have had exactly the equipment they believed 
themselves entitled to. Since the rollers are soft material, 
likely to wear after use, defendants would probably replace 
them again and again during the time they would have 
operated the press in their printing business. Therefore 
it is not an unusual measure to take to place or maintain 
the equipment in working condition. 
In regard to installation, it was shown that Mr. Raymond 
completely assembled the machine except for the rollers 
which defendants were to have cast. The electrical con-
nection was not made, because the original contract pro· 
vided for the purchaser to perform that job. Defendants 
also complained that the press was not bolted to the floor, 
but they admitted at the trial that they had not procured 
any permission from their landlord to bolt the plaintiff's 
press to the floor. Futhermore, they never operated the 
press to determine whether such an attachment was nec-
essary. In fact, when the defendants decided to abandon 
their contract, they did not have the press connected or the 
rollers cast, or attempt to operate it in any way. Actually, 
there was no basis on which they could object to its oper-
ation, and there was no evidence that their demand for 
rescission occured as a result of the manner in which the 
press opera ted. 
POINT NO. 7.: Thai the court erred in not finding in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a summary of all of the evidence before the court 
and as a conclusion and in addition as argument on the 
point above, we have this main proposition. That the 
contract (Ex. P-1) was for the sale of an open press 
without cast rollers, to be delivered at a future date and 
to be installed by the plaintiff. That (Ex.P-2) released 
the plaintiff from said installation. That the conditional 
Sales Contract made and entered for the purpose of se-
curing the purchase price of the original contract of 
October 18 (Ex. P-3) did not increase the property that 
was purchased on October 18 because of the typographical 
error which said "with six rollers" when it should have 
been "six roller". That the plaintiff, at its own expense 
and on the 5th and 6th of April, completely installed said 
machine as contemplated by the original contract. That 
the roller cores that were placed on said machine could 
have been cast by the defendants for an item of $26.00 and 
according to their own witness Mr. Claybaugh (R.194) that 
with the exception of the cast rollers and the electrical 
connections which the defendants had to do themselves, 
the machine could have been operated. 
As a consequence, the defendants received everything 
they bargained for but evidently decided that they would 
be better off if they could force a rescission and buy a 
used machine than to continue to make the payments. 
The used machine cost $600.00. (Ex. D-19) and was 
finally purchased May 9 and like the Judge said when 
he made his decision (R. 236) that the defendants: 
"Began flirting with another company for the install-
ation of anothet· machirw. lt'R just nip and tuck as 
to wheUwr your clients were negotiating with another 
company before the mechanic got there to install the 
first machine, or not." 
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That the great weight of the evidence being entirely 
against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and 
this being an equitable case, and this court having a right 
to review said evidence and the lower court having granted 
damage out of the same transaction that it has rescinded 
which is contrary to law, this court should therefore re-
verse the lower court and find in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendants in its entirety, or if not in its 
entirety, then that part of said judgement granting damages 
to the defendants for the freight paid to a third party 
should be stricken from the judgement granted by the 
lower court and plaintiff be granted his costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER G. MANN 
THOMAS J. STEARNS 
Attorneys for Apellant. 
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